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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I suggest a theoretical approach to the production and 
interpretation of phatic utterances aimed at complementing other previous 
accounts. These argüe that utterances are normally interpreted as phatic either 
because of their occurrence in particular conversational phases forming fixed 
adjacency pairs with other utterances, or because interlocutors actívate specific 
frames and process them in a particular way. Besides, the extant relevance-
theoretic (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995) analysis of these utterances has 
focused on the linguistic properties that make utterances be interpreted as 
phatic, but has not explained how a speaker has to produce an utterance so that 
the hearer interprets it as phatic and why phatic utterances contribute to the 
creation of a feeling of solidarity and ties of unión between interlocutors.. 
1. Introduction 
Since the anthropologist Bronislaw K. Malinowski (1923) described phatic utterances, little 
advance has been made in the study of them and their communicative functions, for some 
authors limited their contributions to repeating his ideas without further elaboration or 
offered a very negative characterisation of them. On the contrary, others tried to go beyond 
these works and explain the reasons why individuáis interpret some utterances as phatic. 
Thus, some conversation analysts have shown that this is due to the stractural properties 
of some utterances and their occurrence with others in very specific conversational phases, 
while some pragmaticians have maintained that the activation of some knowledge structures 
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and the way in which individuáis process them condition their interpretation. More 
recently, within the framework of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995), 
other pragmaticians (Zegarac, 1998; Zegarac and Clark, 1999a) have suggested an 
alternative approach, according to which interlocutors interpretutterances as phatic if the 
information that they convey does not satisfy specifíc expectations of obtaining a certain 
informative benefit. 
However, these works have not accounted for the cognitive operations that speaker and 
hearer have to perform in order to produce and interpret respectively a phatic utterance, ñor 
why phatic utterances contribute to the creation of a feeling of solidarity and ties of unión 
between interlocutors. Therefore, in this paper I will try to offer a complementary proposal 
based on a more general analysis of phatic utterances that I have developed over the last few 
years (Padilla Cruz, 2004a)1. In order to do so, firstly, I introduce some of the different 
perspectives on phatic utterances, starting with Malinowski's (1923) work. Secondly, I 
review the two groups of explanations about why individuáis interpretutterances as phatic. 
Then, I introduce the extant analysis of phatic utterances based on the pragmatic paradigm 
of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995) by Zegarac (1998) and Zegarac 
and Clark (1999a). Finally, I present the complementary proposal that I have developed 
which is also based on Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986,1995) and the notions 
of metarepresentation (e.g. Sperber, 1994) and metarepresentational uses of utterances 
(Noh, 2000). I would like to underline that this is a theoretical proposal, as I agree with 
Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995: 278-279, 1987, 1997: 148-149) that oneof the aimsof 
research in pragmatics must be to formúlate convincing hypotheses about linguistic 
production and comprehension, centred on the mental processes that interlocutors carry 
out, and which should then empirically tested and verified in subsequent work. 
2. Phatic utterances 
When studying the linguistic behaviour of some Melanesian and Oceanic tribes, 
Malinowski (1923) observed narrative episodes which were not used to convey new and 
unknown information but were employed as a means of social interaction with a 
predominantly emotive function. This author czWeáphatic communion "[...] [the] language 
[which] is used in free, aimless, social intercourse" (Malinowski, 1923: 476). However, 
this linguistic behaviour is not at all exclusively restricted to those tribes but is a common 
and recurrent practice in most Western cultures because it is "[...] a type of speech in which 
ties of unión are created by a mere exchange of words" (Malinowski, 1923:478). Among 
its most frequent manifestations, the author mentioned a plethora of formulaic expressions 
of greeting, questions about the interlocutors' health, well-being, family, etc., narrations 
about apparently irrelevant facts or comments about topics that may seem obvious or 
trivial, such as the weather (Malinowski, 1923: 476-479). Their raison d'étre is to avoid 
silence which can originate an unpleasant tensión that may, in turn, have negative 
consequences for social interaction, since taciturnity is regarded in some cultures as an 
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evident sign of hostility or bad mood. 
Malinowski's (1923) work involved a more precise characterisation of an área of 
communication that had not until then been clearly identified, and made progress in the 
analysis of me functions of language. Nevertheless, asLaver(1975:215)complains, "[...] 
the very act of identification has seemed to inhibit further inquiry ", which might have been 
due to the traditional excessive emphasis of Linguistics on the study of form at the expense 
of a deeper insight into the cornmunicative functions and realisations of phatic communion. 
In fact, Coupland, Coupland and Robinson (1992: 207) have shown that many of the 
linguists who have dealt with phatic communion or phatic utterances have only repeated 
Malinowski's (1923) ideas. This was the case of Lyons (1968: 417), Hudson (1980: 109) 
or Silva (1980), who mentioned that phatic communion creates or maintains a feeling of 
solidarity and social well-being among interlocutors. 
But Malinowski's (1923) legacy also consists of an ambiguous approach to phatic 
communion. Although this linguistic behaviour is considered essential for social interaction 
because of the ties of unión that it creates, it is a type of discourse whose most remarkable 
feature is its triviality, obviousness or lack of interest. As a consequence, in other later 
descriptions some authors (e.g. Abercrombie, 1956: 3, 1998: 672; Turner, 1973: 212; 
Leech, 1974: 62) have assigned a negative valué to it and stressed its defective nature as 
regards the transmission of referential information. 
It can be concluded that these approaches presuppose an alternative type of discourse 
in which there is an authentic exchange of information and where language is not simply 
used to establish or keep the interactive contact between individuáis (Coupland, Coupland 
and Robinson, 1992: 210). This has resulted in a distinction between an informative and a 
social type of discourse, which can be traced back to Malinowski's (1923) original 
distinction between language used as an instrument ofreflection or as a mode ofaction, and 
has been present in our linguistic tradition in other dichotomies between two functions of 
language, which have reinforced the idea that "[...] talk was either giving information 
('communication'), or doing something social ('phatic communion')" (Tracy and 
Naughton, 2000: 71).2 
Although this negative characterisation suggests that individuáis regard an utterance as 
phatic whenfhey are aware of the triviality or mereness of its content, other authors have 
attempted to explain how and why individuáis interpret utterances or fragments of 
discourse as being aimed at avoiding silence and establishing or keeping interactive contact. 
In the next section I will review some of their proposals about this issue. 
3. The phatic interpretation of utterances 
The studies that account for the reasons why individuáis interpret some utterances as phatic 
can be classified in two groups. On the one hand, there are those that relate fheir phatic 
interpretation to their being constituents of discourse structures occurring in very specific 
conversational phases. On the other hand, are those studies that argüe that the phaticity of 
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an utterance is not one of its inherent properties, but depends on the interlocutor activating 
particular mental structures and on the way in which he processes it. I devote the following 
two subsections to each of these groups of studies. 
3.1. The infiuence of conversational structure 
As has beenpointed out, phatic communion is manifested through a wide array of linguistic 
tokens, such as greetings, comments or remarks about trivial or obvious matters, and 
questions and answers, most of which are organised as discourse sequences typically 
occurring in the marginal phases of interaction. In many cases, these sequences consist of 
adjacencypairs (e.g. Schegloff, 1972; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973; Sacks, 1992) which, 
following Hoey (1991: 67), arefrozen pairs owing to their little variability and high 
predictability3. This favours interlocutors' interpretation of such utterances as phatic 
(Coupland, Coupland and Robinson, 1992; Coupland, Robinson and Coupland, 1994), 
particularly because many of them are notunderstood as first topics (Schegloff and Sacks, 
1973: 300). On the contrary, they do not transmit authentic factual information because 
they "[...] [are] oriented toward the interactional, relational aspect of communication" 
(Pavlidou, 1994: 490). 
Conversational analysts (e.g. Schegloff, 1972; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973; Schegloff, 
Jefferson and Sacks, 1977; Sacks and Schegloff, 1979; Sacks, 1992) proposed an initial 
criterion of strict adjacency that can be applied to this type of pair and according to which, 
the first element of a pair must be followed by a second one. However, this criterion was 
later on replaced by another of conditional relévame, which establishes that the realisation 
of the first element creates in the speaker very specific expectations about the occurrence 
of possible second elements that the hearer must produce, some of which are preferred 
whereas others are dispreferred by the former (Pomerantz, 1978, 1984; Sacks and 
Schegloff, 1979; Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977). 
In my opinión, the phatic interpretation of some utterances may be conditioned by the 
fact that an interlocutor perceives them as being constituents of highly predictable frozen 
pairs occurring in the opening or closing phases. Thus, if an individual responds to an 
utterance with another that is the preferred element of the pair that both constitute, he may 
be indicating understanding that his interlocutor' s intention was for him to interpret the first 
utterance as phatic. In this way, following Bilmes (1988:74), the second element confirms 
that the first one has been interpreted correctly, as in (1) below. Although an individual 
may intend the hearer to process an utterance as phatic, the hearer may not necessarily 
recognise this, so that, if the second element were the dispreferred one, he would be 
communicating that he has not understood it as phatic, as in (2): 
(1) A: How are you doing? 
B: Fine, thanks. 
(2) A: How are you doing? 
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B: Well, Tve got a terrible headache today and my legs... 
3.2. The importance of cognitive structures and informationprocessing 
In addition to the importance of conversational structure, Kasper (1984), Bahns, 
Burmeister and Vogel (1986: 698), and Schneider (1987, 1988) have stressed that 
individuáis' phatic interpretation of an utterance relies heavily on the activation of mental 
frames and the way in which they process linguistic data. Within such cognitive structures, 
individuáis store information of different nature. Some are higher-order frames which 
contain general abstract information, such as social valúes and conventions about 
interaction or specific exchanges, whereas others are lower-order frames in which 
individuáis store more specific knowledge about, for instance, the grammatical rules of 
their language. 
When interpreting linguistic data, hearers may carry out bottom-up processing by 
establishing a connection between those data and their lower-order frames, or they may 
also process them top-down, if they actívate higher-order frames and search for data that 
match those frames. As Kasper (1984: 3) points out, both procedures interact with each 
other, but bottom-up processing appears more suitable when communicative situations are 
not conventionalised - which prevenís hearers from predicting what will go on in them -
or when they cannot actívate specific frames, while top-down processing seems appropriate 
for communicative situations that are highly conventionalised, when hearers have very firm 
expectations about exchanges or when they have activated many higher-order frames. 
Concerning the interpretation of utterances in the opening phase of a conversation, 
Kasper (1984: 10) sustains that hearers may reach a phatic interpretation if they actívate 
very specific higher-order frames about that context and process them top-down. Such 
frames allow interlocutors to predict the occurrence of conversation movements to a certain 
extent and perform the desired discourse fimctions because they contain information about, 
for example, the necessity to greet other interlocutors, who must greet first, the need to 
exchange phatic tokens, their content, or about how interlocutors can genérate phatic 
sequences. But they will also need a bottom-up analysis in order to confirm whether the 
activated frame is valid to process subsequent movements as phatic or whether they have 
to shift to another frame. Bottom-up processing of the linguistic form of utterances is also 
called for in order to determine their degree of formality or to select another that is cohesive 
with a previous one, as in (3), which contrasts with (4) whose second element is not 
cohesive with the first4 
(3) A: How are you doing? 
B: I'mfine, thanks. 
(4) A: How is it going? 
B: I'mfine, thanks. 
232 Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 
In contrast to the initial phase of a conversation, bottom-up processing is preferable in the 
medial phase of an exchange because utterances are not so conventionalised and 
interlocutors may expect a wider variety of conversational topics (Kasper, 1984: 12). 
Accordingly, in a conversation such as (5), bottom-up processing of the first interlocutor's 
third turn [3a] leads the second interlocutor to actívate a frame of phatic conversation and 
interpret it correctly as phatic, as she shows with the phatic comment [4b]. This gives rise 
to a new phatic comment, [5a], which does not provide very precise information. 
Nonetheless, the second interlocutor shifts then to a frame of information exchange, as can 
be deduced from [5b], because she does not use bottom-up processing and does not take 
into account the formal properties of the previous utterance; the vagueness of the response 
would have been a clear sign that the other interlocutor is acting within a frame of phatic 
exchange: 
[la] Colin: Helio, Angela! 
[Ib] Angela: Helio, Colin! 
[2a] Colin: On your own, then. 
[2b] Angela: Oh, yes. 
[3a] Colin: (sighs) God, the rash hour! 
[3b] Angela: (laughs) 
[4a] Colin: (sighs) 
[4b] Angela: You've worked until now? 
[5a] Colin: Yes, I've been quite busy this afternoon, quite busy. 
[5b] Angela: Oh, what have you done? 
[6a] Colin: Oh, I went to a lecture at three o'clock and then... er... talking to a few 
people about it, afterwards, till about five. Taken me nearly an hour to get back. 
Tube's terribly full. Uh, you know what it's like. 
[6b] Angela: Well, of course. (Adapted from Kasper, 1984: 9) 
Similarly, Coupland, Coupland and Robinson (1992) and Coupland, Robinson and 
Coupland (1994) have shown that in geriatric surgeries the activation of specific frames 
biases the interpretation of a general question such as 'how are you?' either as a phatic 
token or as an inquiry about authentic personal information, whilst Coupland and Ylánne-
McEwen (2000) have illustrated that a topic like the weather can also have a phatic or non-
phatic interpretation in travel agencies. As can be observed, these proposals explain some 
of the mental factors that contribute to the phatic interpretation of utterances. However, 
they do not consider whether there are other cognitive factors that condition their phatic 
interpretation. This is an issue that has been tackled by some Relevance Theory (Sperber 
and Wilson, 1986, 1995) pragmaticians, so I turn to it in the next section. 
On the Phatic Interpretation of Utterances 233 
4. Relevance Theory and phatic utterances 
Within pragmatics, Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986,1995) is currently one 
of the most fruitful models, as it has involved a true revolution in this field by offering 
solutions to many linguistic problems. In this section I will first summarise its theoretical 
postulates and then discuss the analysis of phatic utterances suggested by some of its 
practitioners. 
4.1. Basic theoretical postulates 
Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995) is aimed at explaining why an 
individual selects one interpretation of anutterance out of many possible ones and believes 
it to be the interpretation that the speaker might have intended to communicate. It conceives 
communication as an ostensive-inferential activity in which the speaker modifies the 
hearer's cognitive environment - i.e. the set of facts that are manifest to him or, in other 
words, which he can represent mentally - with an utterance because she has an informative 
intention, which is the set of assumptions that she intends to make manifest to him (Sperber 
and Wilson, 1986,1995:58). Inaddition, communication isunderstood as anovertprocess 
in which the speaker also has a communicative intention, which is her intention to make 
manifest to the hearer that she has indeed that particular informative intention (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1986,1995: 61). 
For the hearer to recover the interpretation intended by the speaker, he will have to 
contextualise the utterance by relating the information he obtains from its linguistic 
decoding to a subset of the information he has already stored, which constitutes his context 
for interpretation (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 108). The result of this process is cognitive 
effects, that is, the strengthening or contradiction of oíd assumptions, or contextual 
implications, which are new assumptions that can only be derived from the joint interaction 
of the information conveyed by the utterance with the oíd information the hearer possesses. 
However, this requires some cognitive effort from the hearer, which depends on his effort 
in selecting a suitable context for interpreting the utterance and its psychological 
complexity, since its syntax or unusual lexical items may render it more difficult to 
understand (Wilson, 1993: 348). 
Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) claim that the hearer will choose a particular 
interpretation of an utterance if its processing yields a satisfactory amount of cognitive 
effect that offsets the cognitive effort invested in obtaining them, i.e. if he fmds that 
particular interpretation relevant. Furthermore, the hearer must also have some 
expectations of relevance and think that he will indeed recover those effects; otherwise, he 
will not pay attention to that utterance. An utterance becomes irrelevant if the assumptions 
made manifest are not related to any assumption that the hearer entertains, if the hearer 
already possesses those assumptions and fheir strength is not altered by the processing of 
the utterance, or if fhey are incompatible with the assumptions of the hearer and are so 
weak that they cannot modify them (Sperber and Wilson, 1986,1995: 120-121). 
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According to Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995: 157, 270) and Wilson and Sperber 
(2002:251,256-257), individuáis are always interested in establishing the optimaldegree 
of relevance of the information that they receive, so utterances must communicate a 
presumption of their own optimal relevance: their production must be accompanied by a 
tacit guarantee that their processing will provide the hearer with cognitive effects that 
compénsate his processing effort and that they are the most relevant ostensive stimuli that 
the speaker can think of, depending on her abilities and preferences. From this presumption 
of optimal relevance, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 260) formúlate the Communicative 
Principie of Relevance: " Any act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption 
of its own optimal relevance"5. This principie inspires the relevance-theoretic 
comprehension procedure, which leads the hearer to follow the interpretive path that 
requires the least cognitive effort possible when testing his interpretive hypotheses of an 
utterance and to stop when his expectations of relevance are satisfíed (Wilson, 1999:136; 
Wilson and Sperber, 2002:259). This procedure reflects that the fact that the hearer easily 
accesses one interpretation of an utterance makes him believe that that interpretation is the 
one that the speaker intended to communicate. Similarly, this procedure makes it quite 
reasonable that the hearer should stop at the first interpretation that satisfíes his expectations 
of relevance: fhere should not be more than one optimally relevant interpretation of an 
utterance, since that would cause him the additional unnecessary effort of deciding about 
one of them. 
4.2. The extant Relevance-Theoretic approach to phatic utterances 
Within the framework of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986,1995), Nicolle and 
Clark (1998), Zegarac (1998) and Zegarac and Clark (1999a) have tried to explain why an 
individual recovers a phatic interpretation of utterances. Like other authors, they also think 
that the phaticity of utterances is not one of their inherent features but depends on the 
interpretation that interlocutors make of them. 
Thus, Zegarac (1998: 334-341) argües that some utterances with which interlocutors 
frequently initiate a conversation do not communicate any information that achieves an 
optimal level of relevance because processing them in the most easily accessible context 
does not yield cognitive effects or results in very few of them. By virtue of the 
Communicative Principie of Relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1995), it would be expected 
that the interaction of the assumptions constituting the speaker's informative intention with 
those present in the hearer's context results in enough cognitive effects to compénsate his 
cognitive effort. However, the assumptions made manifest by those utterances are already 
manifest in the cognitive environment of both interlocutors, so they do not achieve an 
optimal level of relevance because of the speaker' s informative intention but because of the 
fact that she has a communicative intention. 
Accordingly, Zegarac (1998: 335) shows that an utterance such as (6) will be 
interpreted as phatic if it is already manifest to the interlocutors that fhere is a postal strike 
that very day: 
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(6) There is a postal strike today. 
Since the speaker's intention is not to inform the hearer about this fact, as he is already 
acquainted with it, he will reach an implicated conclusión6 such as (7) about the speaker's 
desire to maintain interactive contact: 
(7) The speaker is willing to communicate with me. 
According to Zegarac and Clark (1999a: 329-334), the interpretation of an utterance is 
phatic if it implies a proposition referring to the speaker's desire to speak with the hearer. 
Therefore, phatic utterances are utterances that give rise to a phatic interpretation and 
phatic communication includes ostensive acts of communication that are interpreted as 
phatic. Finally, they also state that an individual may be quite likely to recover a phatic 
interpretation of an utterance if its linguistic form is easy to process (Zegarac and Clark, 
1999a: 336). Thus, a hearer will regard (8) as phatic becauseof its form; if the speaker did 
not intend him to do so, she would have to resort to another formulation, such as (9) or 
(10), where the additional linguistic material increases the hearer's processing effort and 
allows the speaker to show her real interest in the hearer: 
(8) How are you? 
(9) How are you these days? 
(10) How are you now that you've had the operation? 
Although Zegarac (1998) and Zegarac and Clark's (1999a) account offers a criterion that 
enables us to recognise this type of utterance, it has been severely criticised by Ward and 
Horn (1999), who contend that it reduces a very complex linguistic phenomenon to the 
mere indication of willingness to establish or maintain interactive contact. As I have 
commented elsewhere (Padilla Cruz, 2004a: 329), their conception of phatic 
communication might have been influenced by the belief in the existence of a purely 
informative discourse that makes manifest new assumptions which the hearer can combine 
with oíd ones in order to derive cognitive effects. However, phatic utterances result in very 
few or no cognitive effects at all so they would not be truly informative utterances. 
Ward and Horn (1999:556-557) also find a series of methodological problems in their 
proposal, for they think that, by relying on the notions of mutual manifestness and 
cognitive environment, Zegarac (1998) and Zegarac and Clark (1999a) adopt an omniscient 
view of communication, in which either the environment determines what each individual 
can mentally represent or the interlocutors share a certain knowledge that indicates in which 
circumstances they are more likely to be able to entertain some assumptions. Nevertheless, 
Zegarac and Clark (1999b: 572-574) maintain that individuáis can manipúlate their 
interpretive context so as to make sure that a phatic interpretation of an utterance will be 
optimally relevant, even if another non-phatic one could also be so. This is only possible 
if their cognitive environment includes assumptions about different ways of interacting, the 
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relevance of particular conversational topics or the social norms which establish what 
counts as appropriate linguistic behaviour. That knowledge conditions the hearer's 
comprehension by limiting the assumptions that he will make about how the speaker intends 
anutterance to be optimally relevant7. For this reason, Zegarac and Clark (1999a: 336-337) 
conclude that the more frequently an utterance or topic is used with a specific purpose, the 
stronger the connection between it and that purpose and, likewise, the more frequently an 
utterance is used to achieve a particular interpretation, the stronger the link between that 
utterance and that interpretation. 
Furthermore, Ward and Horn (1999:562) also think that Zegarac (1998) and Zegarac 
and Clark (1999a) do not offer adequate methods for determining whether an utterance is 
more or less phatic even if Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986,1995) can help 
predict when individuáis are likely to derive phatic interpretations. They also question the 
statement that utterances will be interpreted as phatic if they require little cognitive effort. 
Nonetheless, these critiques are difficult to understand because Ward and Horn (1999) 
admit that the usage of non-conventionalised phatic utterances can significantly increase 
the cognitive effort of the hearer and yield additional cognitive effects. According to 
Zegarac and Clark (1999b: 566), what causes certain utterances be interpreted as phatic is 
the existence of systematic correspondences between particular situational contexts where 
they are used, their linguistic and paralinguistic features and the communicative functions 
in such contexts. Although the notion of phatic communication is rafher intuitive, it is 
precisely the similarity arising between the interpretations of a wide array of utterances 
sharing specific characteristics that helps interlocutors identify them as phatic. 
Even though Zegarac (1998) and Zegarac and Clark (1999a) offer an alternative 
explanation of the phatic interpretation of utterances, based on the way such interpretations 
achieve an optimal level of relevance, I consider that they fail to take into account some of 
the previous contributions on phatic utterances and to address a very important aspect of 
these utterances in social interaction: the creation of a feeling of solidarity and ties of unión 
between interlocutors. For this reason, in the next section I will present a complementary 
proposal aimed at answering this problem, which is also based on Relevance Theory 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1986,1995) and on the metarepresentational use (Noh, 2000) of this 
typeof utterance. 
5. A complementary Relevance-Theoretic proposal 
As mentioned above, this proposal is a theoretical explanation which reflects on the 
linguistic properties of phatic utterances, the origin of the effects that they cause and the 
cognitive operations that interlocutors are believed to perform in order to achieve them. In 
the previous section it has been shown that utterances are assigned a phatic interpretation 
when the assumptions that they make manifest are already manifest in the cognitive 
environment of both interlocutors (Zegarac, 1998; Zegarac and Clark, 1999a). It should 
be borne in mind that the notion of cognitive environment is not only restricted to the 
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physical setting which is mutually manifest to the interlocutors but includes other 
contextual sources whichthey canaccess, suchastheirencyclopaedic, factual, biographic 
or mutual knowledge (Yus Ramos, 1997-1998, 2000, 2000-2001). I think that it is 
precisely the fact that some assumptions are previously manifest to interlocutors which is 
an essential factor in the production and comprehension of phatic utterances as well as in 
understanding the generation of the effects associated with phatic utterances, as it implies 
that individuáis will have mental representations about the facts, events, states of affairs or 
opinions to which these utterances refer. Besides, since interlocutors share that cognitive 
environment, it will also be rather likely that a certain degree of similarity should arise 
between the assumptions that they entertain and the assumptions that those utterances make 
manifest, which favours solidarity and ties of unión. From my viewpoint, individuáis can 
exploit these features during the production and interpretation of phatic utterances in order 
to genérate these effects, as I show below. 
5.1. On the metarepresentational nature of phatic utterances 
Sperber and Wilson (1986,1995:228-229) argüe that an utterance may describe an existing 
or desirable state of affairs when its logical form represents that very state of affairs. On 
the other hand, if its logical form represents another public or prívate representation 
because of the similarity arising with the logical form of that representation, the utterance 
interprets it, i.e. itisametarepresentation(e.g. Sperber, 1994). That relationof similarity 
originates because the utterance and that representation share a series of logical and 
contextual implications, and increases as the number of those implications increases. 
In her work on metarepresentations, Noh (2000: 74-78) introduced the notion of 
metarepresentational use of utterances, which alludes to cases in which utterances 
represent other acts of communication. She distinguished between metalinguistic and 
interpretive metarepresentational utterances: the former metarepresent abstract linguistic 
expressions while the latter metarepresent other utterances or thoughts8. Within this last 
type of metarepresentations she grouped what she termed echoic metarepresentations, by 
means of which the speaker also transmits a certain attitude towards the metarepresented 
content. Among the different attitudes she can convey, Wilson (1999: 147) highlights a 
dissociative or rejecting attitude, typical of irony (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995) or 
denials (Carston, 1996); a questioning attitude, characteristic of echo-questions 
(Blakemore, 1994; Noh, 1995, 1998, 2000), and another of endorsement or acceptance. 
The transmission of one particular attitude is crucial in the interpretation of an echoic 
metarepresentational utterance as it achieves an optimal level of relevance because of that 
attitude. Wilson (1999:148) includes echoic metarepresentations within the broader class 
of attributive metarepresentations, by means of which a speaker attributes the 
metarepresented content to another individual.9 
In my opinión, another factor which determines the production of phatic utterances 
by a speaker and their interpretation as such by a hearer is their metarepresentational 
character: the speaker can metarepresent with utterances other utterances, thoughts, 
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opinions or assumptions manifest to both individuáis and the hearer may realise that these 
are indeed manifest to himself. So, in Sperber and Wilson's (1986, 1995) terms, phatic 
utterances can be regarded as cases of interpretive utterances because the speaker 
metarepresents one or some of the public or private representations that are mutually 
manifest to the hearer and to herself. In other words, these utterances are interpretive 
metarepresentations (Noh, 2000) and, as such, they are interpretations that the speaker 
makes of assumptions, thoughts or opinions about a state of affairs that are mutually 
manifest to both interlocutors in the cognitive environment that they share. 
Like any other utterance, a phatic utterance interprets or metarepresents the speaker's 
own thoughts, opinions or assumptions. But similar thoughts, opinions or assumptions may 
also be manifest to the hearer because both interlocutors share the same cognitive 
environment. Therefore, I think that by means of a phatic utterance the speaker 
metarepresents her own thoughts, opinions or assumptions and, simultaneously, 
metarepresents those of the hearer's. In this case, phatic utterances are examples of 
attributive metarepresentations of the thoughts, opinions or assumptions which the speaker 
thinks the hearer entertains. 
In order to illustrate this, consider the following situation. An individual goes to the 
hairdresser's because she wants her hair cut as it is becoming long and untidy, she would 
like to change her hairdo and have a new and more fashionable look. In such a situation, 
assumptions such as those in (11) would be manifest to her, and might have, as logical or 
contextual implications, assumptions such as those in (12): 
(11) a. My hair is very long. 
b. My hair is untidy. 
c. My hair needs cutting. 
d. I do not like this hairdo. 
e. This hairdo makes me look horrible. 
f. I would really like to have another hairdo. 
(12) a. A haircut will make me look much better. 
b. A new hairdo will make me look more fashionable. 
c. A haircut will prevent my hair from growing in an untidy way. 
d. A new hairdo will make me look more attractive. 
Obviously, some or all of those assumptions will also be manifest to the hairdresser, who, 
because of his encyclopaedic knowledge, is perfectly aware that people normally get their 
hair cut to look better, more attractive or just for the sake of a change. As he is doing his 
work, he utters (13), whose propositional content is trivial in that situation and is 
consequently interpreted by the customer as phatic, since the assumptions that it makes 
manifest are already manifest to her: 
(13) Your hair is very long. 
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By uttering (13), the hairdresser is metarepresenting some of the assumptions manifest 
to himself and, in addition, some of the assumptions thathe thinks his customer entertains. 
Thus, he is attributing to her the manifestness of those assumptions. The hairdresser senses 
that those assumptions are also manifest to his customer because both of them share the 
same cognitive environment. However, as Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) affirm, the 
existence of a mutual cognitive environment does not mean that the two interlocutors 
entertain exactly the same assumptions but rather similar ones, as their perception of reality 
or their storing other assumptions influences the degree of manifestness of some of them. 
For this reason, when uttering (13), the hairdresser is metarepresenting at one and the same 
time both his own assumptions and other very similar ones which he attributes to the 
customer. The assumptions metarepresented by him may in turn have logical or contextual 
implications similar to the logical or contextual implications that the customer may draw 
from the assumptions manifest to herself (12). 
Nevertheless, with the phatic utterance the hairdresser does not only metarepresent 
attributively the thoughts, opinions or assumptions manifest to the customer. His sharing 
of the same cognitive environment as the customer and the accessing of contextual sources, 
such as his biographical or encyclopaedic knowledge about the latter, also makes manifest 
to him that his customer has a particular attitude towards those thoughts, opinions or 
assumptions, and that enables him to determine it. Thus, for instance, thanks to his 
biographical knowledge about the customer, the hairdresser may know that she is the sort 
of person who loves short hair, is always in fashion and changes her hairstyle every now 
and then. In that way, the hairdresser can draw a conclusión about her attitude towards the 
metarepresented thoughts, opinions or assumptions. 
Following Wilson (1999), I believe that, by means of a phatic utterance, the speaker 
metarepresents the assumptions whose manifestness she attributes to her interlocutor and 
also expresses an attitude towards them. For this reason, the speaker makes an echoic use 
of them or, in other words, her utterance becomes an echoic attributive metarepresentation. 
In my opinión, the attitude expressed by the speaker must be one of endorsement or 
acceptance of the metarepresented assumptions. With that attitude she indicates and 
provides the hearer with further evidence that she shares the thoughts, opinions or 
assumptions that her utterance metarepresents and, simultaneously, the assumptions 
manifest to him. Therefore, I think that phatic utterances achieve an optimal level of 
relevance with a phatic interpretation because the speaker metarepresents thoughts, 
opinions or assumptions that are mutually manifest in the cognitive environment shared 
with the hearer, informs the hearer that she is saying or thinking something which 
resembles his thoughts, and has an attitude of endorsement or acceptance towards those 
assumptions. 
As inthe case of irony (Sperber and Wilson, 1986,1995), it must be stressed that for 
a phatic utterance to produce the cognitive effects intended by the speaker, the hearer must 
recognise that that utterance is echoic, identify the metarepresented thoughts, opinions or 
assumptions and understand that the speaker' s attitude towards them is one of endorsement 
or acceptance. Moreover, although in the previous example some of the assumptions 
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metarepresented are easily recoverable or accessible, in other situations the speaker may 
also metarepresent assumptions that are not immediately accessible or that the hearer may 
not directly identify because their manifestness is due to some previous phenomenon or 
behaviour, or they are part of their cultural or biographic knowledge (Sperber and Wilson, 
1986, 1995; Hamamoto, 1998; Seto, 1998). 
Imagine that a group of former university students who spent some years together in 
a hall of residence meet for dinner at a restaurant several years after having ended their 
studies and left the hall. All of them enjoyed their time at the hall quite a lot for they shared 
great experiences going out to pubs, discos or parties, meeting and making new friends, 
discovering the meaning of comradeship, etc. Since they lived and spent so much time 
together, they have stored in their minds, as part of their biographical knowledge, 
assumptions about different aspects of the time spent in hall. Moreover, their time in hall 
has been a recurrent topic of conversation on previous occasions when they have gathered. 
For this reason, some of the assumptions that each of them entertains individually will also 
be manifest to the others and some of them will even be very similar or practically 
identical. Imagine now that one of those former students utters (14) during the dinner: 
(14) Our days in hall were incredibly wonderful! 
The other fellows will interpret the utterance as phatic because the assumptions made 
manifest are already manifest to them. In this case, a past phenomenon, such as the life of 
a group of students in hall, or a previous behaviour, such as having talked about it in the 
past, are the source of the manifestness of the assumptions constituting part of their 
biographical knowledge. Therefore, by uttering (14), the speaker is metarepresenting 
assumptions that are manifest to herself and which she senses are also manifest to her 
audience because they share a similar cognitive environment; the speaker echoes those 
assumptions and transmits at the same time an attitude of endorsement or acceptance 
towards them, thereby communicating to the audience that she shares similar, if not 
identical, assumptions. 
5.2. On the generation of solidarity and ties of unión 
From my point of view, the human ability to metarepresent the thoughts, opinions or 
assumptions attributable to another person and the pragmatic processes intervening in 
linguistic comprehension play a crucial role in generating a feeling of solidarity and ties of 
unión between interlocutors. As with any other utterance, when processing a phatic 
utterance the hearer will have to enrich some of the linguistic components of its logical 
form in order to obtain a fully-fledged propositional form, i.e. he will have to recover its 
explicatures. 
Thus, in addition to the pragmatic processes of disambiguation and reference 
assignment of linguistic elements such as 'your' in (13) or 'our' in (14), the customer will 
have to enrich the scalar predícate 'long' and determine to what extent the hairdresser 
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considers her hair to be long, whereas the audience at the dinner will have to enrich 
'wonderfiü' in order to determine what the speaker exactly means by this concept. After 
doing so, if the explicatures recovered allow the customer and the audience to appreciate 
that both they and their interlocutors assign the adjectives a valué which coincides or is very 
similar, they will deduce that there is a certain degree of similarity between the assumptions 
that they entertain and those metarepresented by their respective interlocutors. If this 
happens in the previous examples, the customer may conclude that there is a certain 
agreement between herself and the hairdresser as regards the length of her hair, whereas 
the other fellows at the dinner may infer that they and their mate have the same opinión 
about the wonderfulness of their days at the university hall of residence. Therefore, when 
processing phatic utterances hearers can verify that the metarepresented assumptions 
resemble some or all of the assumptions manifest to themselves, and the determination of 
their degree of similarity depends partially on pragmatic processes. 
On the other hand, as Sperber and Wilson (1986,1995), Wilson (1995,1999) or Noh 
(2000) explain, the degree of similarity or identity between assumptions which are manifest 
to hearers and those that speakers metarepresent using a phatic utterance depends on the 
logical or contextual implications that the two sets of assumptions share, so that the more 
implications they share, the greater the degree of similarity between them. Accordingly, 
if assumptions such as those in (12) are manifest to both hairdresser and the customer, the 
customer will realise that the degree of similarity between her own assumptions and those 
of the hairdresser's is high. Likewise, if the audience at the dinner can derive, as logical 
or contextual implications, assumptions referring, for instance, to their desire to relive 
those days, to be a university student in hall again, to meet the same type of people, etc., 
and senses that some or all of them are also manifest to their interlocutor, the audience will 
note that the degree of similarity between their respective sets of manifest assumptions is 
also high. 
For this reason, I think the production and interpretation of phatic utterances 
contributes to the bringing about of a feeling of solidarity and ties of unión between 
interlocutors if the speaker is able to metarepresent assumptions that are similar to those of 
the hearer and expresses her endorsement or acceptance of them, if the hearer then obtains 
an explicature that coincides, to a greater or lesser extent, with the speaker's informative 
intention, and if he recovers some logical or contextual implications that are similar or 
identical to those already manifest to himself. The greater the degree of similarity between 
the explicature that the hearer obtains and the speaker's informative intention, the greater 
the degree of affinity between the two individuáis. Likewise, the more logical or contextual 
implications shared by the assumptions manifest to both interlocutors, the greater the 
degree of agreement between them and, consequently, the stronger their feeling of 
solidarity and their ties of unión. Finally, if the hearer recognises the attitude of the speaker 
towards the metarepresented assumptions, he will have additional evidence that she 
believes or thinks something that is similar to his own opinions or thoughts, and that they 
have a common similar viewpoint about it. 
242 Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 
6. Conclusión 
In this paper I have suggested an analysis of phatic utterances as echoic attributive 
metarepresentations with which the speaker expresses an attitude of endorsement or 
acceptance of metarepresented assumptions. In my opinión, this analysis has two 
immediate consequences. 
On the one hand, as has been observed above, the reviewed studies of phatic 
utterances show that the phaticity of an utterance may be determined by factors such as its 
occurrence in a particular conversational phase being part of an adjacency pair, the 
activation of specific frames, the performance of a certain processing or by the fact that the 
assumptions that it makes manifest are already manifest in the interlocutors' cognitive 
environment. In addition to these factors, I think another one can be added: a hearer can 
interpret an utterance as phatic if he realises that the speaker is metarepresenting 
assumptions whose manifestness she is attributing to him and, at the same time, conveying 
an attitude of endorsement or acceptance of those assumptions. 
On the other hand, as regards the creation of solidarity and ties of unión between 
interlocutors that has been attributed to phatic utterances, I believe that it is a direct 
consequence of the similarity or identity that arises between the assumptions manifest to 
each individual, which the speaker is able to metarepresent using a phatic utterance, and 
of the transmission of an attitude of endorsement or acceptance. The hearer can determine 
that similarity or identity through the pragmatic processes of enrichment of the logical form 
of the utterance or testing whether those assumptions have similar logical or contextual 
implications. Moreover, the transmission of that particular attitude towards the 
metarepresented assumptions contributes positively to the hearer realising that the speaker 
also entertains thoughts, opinions or assumptions which share a certain similarity or 
identity with those that are manifest to himself. 
However, due to the theoretical nature of this work, it must be admitted that it is 
necessary to empirically test the hypotheses formulated in it. Therefore, it should be 
verified whether speakers notice that the assumptions made manifest by a phatic utterance 
are already mutually manifest in their cognitive environment and are also likely to be 
manifest to their interlocutors, if they perform the cognitive operations described and if 
they are awareofthem. Furthermore, following Wilson's (2003) suggestions, itwouldalso 
be advisable to investígate whether psychically handicapped individuáis have any difficulty 
in processing phatic utterances or process them differently. 
Notes 
1. Foradiscussionof other issuesrelatedto phatic utterances, see Padilla Cruz (2001,2002, 
2004b, 2004c, 2004d). 
2. See Coupland and Ylánne-McEwen (2000:179) for a similar comment, and Gómez Morón 
(1998) or Holmes (2000), among many others, for critiques againstthe inappropriateness of these 
distinctions. 
On the Phatic Interpretation of Utterances 243 
3. As Schegloff (1972) explains, the fact that somepairs are practically invariable does not 
exelude the possibility of expansión or insertion of other linguistic elements because of the 
interlocutors' mood or social relationship (e.g. Sifianou, 1989; Sacks, 1992) and other 
sociocultural conventions operating (e.g. Silva, 1980; Jakubowska, 1999; Sherzer, 1999). 
4. Kasper (1984: 11) also warns and illustrates that an excessive focus on utterances and 
bottom-up processing may lead to erroneous interpretations and misunderstandings. 
5. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 260) also propose the more general Cognitive Principie of 
Relevance: "Human cognition is oriented towards the maximisation of optimal relevance". 
6. Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995: 194) distinguish between implicatedpremises - i.e. 
assumptions that the hearer can retrieve from his memory and which lead him to a particular 
interpretation - and implicated conclusions - i.e. assumptions that he believes that the speaker 
expected him to derive so as to reach an optimally relevant interpretation. 
7. See Nicolle and Clark (1998) and ¿egarac (1998) for some remarks onthe importance of 
conventionalisation and standardisation processes for the interpretation of phatic utterances. 
8. See Noh (2000) for some examples. 
9. In an analogous way, there are cases of non-attributive metarepresentations when the 
speaker mentions utterances that she expeets the hearer to produce in a particular communicative 
situation (Wilson, 1999). 
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